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COMMENTS
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978: Tension Between Congress
and the Courts.
During the fourteen years since the enactment of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),' tension
has developed between Congress and the federal judiciary regarding implementation of the Act. This tension is manifested
by the differences between what Congress intended to promote
and the narrower construction given the law by the federal
courts. Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act Amendments of 1978 to clarify its intentions in several
troublesome areas. But despite the Amendments' impact of setting forth decisive answers with respect to some issues, the scope
of the Amendments was not so pervasive as to settle all controversies. Differences in breadth of interpretation continue to exist
between Congress and the federal judiciary on a few significant
issues concerning age discrimination protection.
A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act

The efforts of Congress to combat age discrimination date
back to the early 1960's when it enacted laws to aid the elderly
in employment.' These acts did not expressly forbid age discrimination, however, and an Executive order issued by President
Johnson in 1964 only prohibited federal contractors and subcontractors from discriminating on the basis of age." Congress con1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
2. See Older Americans Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-73, 79 Stat. 218 (codified at 42
U.S.C. $5 3001-3056f (1976));Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78
Stat. 508 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
2701-29961 (1976));Manpower Development & Training Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-415, 76 Stat. 23 (codified at 42 U.S.C. $5 2571-2628
(1976)).
3. Exec. Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. 3301 app., at 379 (1976).
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sidered including age as a prohibited basis for discrimination in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964' but decided to wait until the Secretary of Labor could investigate and propose recommendations
for specific age discrimination legislation.' The Secretary's subsequent report led to the passage of the ADEA in 1967?
The ADEA's express purpose is "to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from
the impact of age on employment."' The Act originally prohibited private employers with more than twenty-five employees
from discriminating on the basis of age against prospective or
current employees between forty and sixty-five years of age. In
1974 the Act was extended to encompass the federal civil service, state and local governments, and private employers with
more than twenty employee^.^ The trend toward greater protection of the elderly continued when Congress enacted the Older
Americans Amendments of 1975@to prohibit unreasonable discrimination on the basis of age in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance.

B. Court Enforcement
Paradoxically, Congress' deliberate movement toward
greater protection of the elderly against employment discrimination has met noticeable opposition from segments of the federal
judiciary, including the Supreme Court. The Court to date has
decided two mandatory government retirement cases outside
ADEA coverage,1° has ruled on four ADEA cases,ll and has denied certiorari in at least seven other ADEA actions.12 Of these
4. 42 U.S.C. $8 2000e to 2000e-15 (1976).
5. Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm
Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.1311, 1328 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Age
Discrirnina tion].
6. Id.
7. 29 U.S.C. 5 621(b) (1976).
8. Id. 55 630(b), 633a.
9. Pub. L. No. 94-135, 89 Stat. 713 (amending the Older Americans Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. 55 3001-3056f (1976)).
10. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 US. 307 (1976).
11. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575
(1978); United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977); Shell Oil Co. v. Dartt, 434 U.S.
99 (1977), aff'g,539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
12. Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
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thirteen cases, two decisions do not lend themselves to being labeled either pro- or anti-elderly,lS one granted relief to the
plaintiff employee in a four-to-four decision without opinion,"
one protected the plaintiff employee,l5 and the other nine cases
furthered the interests of the defendant employers.16 The conclusion arguably to be derived from the holdings in these cases is
that the Court has construed the ADEA and its amendments so
narrowly that the broad age discrimination protection Congress
intended for the elderly has not been fully realized.
The divergent views taken by Congress and the Supreme
Court have understandably provoked confusion and dissension
(1978); Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1066 (1977); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1977); Z i e r v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1977); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1974); De Loraine v. MEBA Pension Trust, 355 F.
Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd,499 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 US. 1009 (1974).
13. Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying notes 10204 infra).
14. Shell Oil Co. v. Dartt, 434 U.S. 99 (1977), aff'g539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976)
(discussed in text accompanying notes 136-37 infra).
15. Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 966 (1977). See note 96 infra.
16. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979) (resort to state remedies is
mandatory); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (provision of Foreign Service Act of
1946 requiring persons covered by Foreign Service retirement system to retire at age 60
is not violative of equal protection concerns of due process clause of fifth amendment);
United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (mandatory retirement of pre-age 65
workers pursuant to terms of bona fide retirement plan came within exception to ADEA
and was thus not a "subterfuge"); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307 (1976) (state statute mandating retirement of uniformed state police officers at age
50 does not violate equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment); Dean v. American
Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1977) (punitive
damages and general damages for pain and suffering not allowed in private ADEA actions); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1977) (damages for pain and suffering or emotional or psychic distress not
allowed in ADEA suits); Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1008 (1977) (forced early retirement pursuant to bona fide pension plan not violative of ADEA); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 449 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1974) (defendant employer which raised bona fide occupational qualification defense successfully carried its burden in showing that it had a rational basis in fact
to believe that elimination of its maximum hiring-age policy would increase the likelihood of risk of harm to passengers); De Loraine v. MEBA Pension Trust, 355 F. Supp.
89 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd,499 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974) (even
if pension trust in question was covered under ADEA, the pension trust's conduct with
respect to plaintiff was within the exemption to Act that permits labor organizations to
observe terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan).
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among the lower federal courts. In over one hundred ADEA
cases brought in the lower federal courts, splits among the circuits have developed-and in some cases continue to exist-on
almost every major issue.'? The splits among the circuits have
not arisen solely because of Congress' and the Supreme Court's
conflicting views; rather, the confusion also stems from the fact
that the ADEA is a hybrid of the Civil Rights Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and, to a lesser extent, the National Labor
17.

Table I. Congress and the Courts
ISSUES
1. Mandatory

Government
Retirement
2. Pension Plan

CONGRESS

SUPREME COURT

NO: with some
exceptions: 1974
Amendment, 1978
Amendment

Brad ley

YES: 1977 McMann

NO: 1978 Amendment

Forced
Retirement
3. Lenient

denied in

YES: 1978 Amendment

YES: 1978 Lorillard

YES: 4
NO: 3

NO: 1978 Comment

NO: 1978 cert. denied
in Dean

YES:0

NO: 1978 cert. denied
in Dean, 1977
cert. denied in
Rogers

YES:0

NO: 1977 Dartt

YES:3
NO: 4

Trial
Available
5. Punitive

Damages
Avaiable
6. Damages for

Pain and
Suffering
7. 180 Days

'

NO: 1978 Comment

Jurisdictional
8. Federal

I

NO: 1978 Comment

Conciliation
Jurisdictional
9. State Remedy

Exhaustion
Jurisdictional

YES: 7
NO: 1

YES: 1978 Comment

BFoQ
Standard
4. Jury

CIRCUITS

NO: 6

NO: 8

lm4

NO: 2

NO: 1978 Comment

YES: 1979 Evans

NO: 6
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Relations Act.18 Inconsistent results are inevitable when the varying legal standards of these three acts are grafted into the
ADEA setting without the benefit of a principled, uniform approach. Thus, some circuits appear to be more inclined toward
Congress' pro-elderly approach, and others appear to subscribe
to the Supreme Court's less accommodating view toward the
elderly.'@ However, the correlation is far from perfect and the
relative mix of causal factors may be difficult to pinpoint.

C. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments
of 1978
The adoption of the Age Discrimination in Employment A d
Amendments of 1978 (1978 amendment^)^^ can be traced to at
least two driving forces. First, numerous hearings conducted by
the House Select Committee on Aging revealed mounting public
opposition to mandatory retirement based solely on age.21 Sec18. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,578 (1978) (discussingroots and hybrid nature of
ADEA-including reference to National Labor Relations Act). The prohibitions in 5
4(a)(l)-(2) of the ADEA are taken "in haec verba" from 5 703(a)(l)-(2)of title VII of the
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. at 584; compare 29 U.S.C. 5
623(a)(1)-(2) (1976) with 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(a) (1976), but 5 7(b) of the ADEA expressly provides that the Act is to be enforced in accordance with the "powers, remedies,
and procedures" of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 5 626(b) (1976)
(incorporating 29 U.S.C. $8 211(b), 216(b)-(d), 217 (1976)). In addition to legal relief
analogous to the FLSA, see Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840
n.10 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 US. 1022 (1977), 5 7(b) of the ADEA provides for equitable relief with language similar to 706(g) of title VII. Compare 29 U.S.C. 5 626(b)
(1976) with 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(g) (1976).
Judges have not been able to agree on the appropriate analogy in many cases. The
analogy between 5 7(d) of the ADEA and 5 706(d) of title VII was the basis of a decision
which was affirmed by an evenly divided court. See Shell Oil Co. v. Dartt, 434 U.S. 99
(1977), aff'g,539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976). Compare 29 U.S.C. 5 626(d) (1976) with 42
U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(e) (1976). Section 14(b) of the ADEA has been found to be virtually the
same as 5 706(b) of title VII, Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755 (1979);
compare 29 U.S.C. 5 633(b) (1976) with 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(c) (1976), yet some judges
believe that enforcement proceedings under the FLSA are the more appropriate analogy,
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. at 766 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In another case,
the majority opinion stated that # 706(b) of title VII was the basis for § 14(b) of the
ADEA, Goger v. H. K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1974); compare 42 U.S.C. 5
2000e-5(c) (1976) with 29 U.S.C. 5 633(b) (1976), while the concurring opinion stated
that 5 706(b) of title VII should instead be compared with 5 7(b) of the ADEA, 492 F.2d
at 17 (Garth, J., concurring); compare 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(c) (1976) with 29 U.S.C. 5
626(b) (1976)).
19. See note 17 supra.
20. Pub. L. No. 95-256,92 Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. $5 623,624,626,631,633a,
634; 5 U.S.C. $5 8335, 8339 (1976)).
21. See, e.g., Auocational and Employment Needs of Retired Persons: Hearings
Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Active Americans
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ondly, Congress seemed displeased with the federal judiciary for
several ADEA interpretations that created large loopholes in the
protection Congress intended to provide for the elderly?
In response to both public sentiment and judicial interpretations, Congress enacted the 1978 Amendments, which raised
the protected age limit for private sector employees from sixtyfive to seventy years of age as of January 1, 1979.as In addition,
mandatory retirement for most federal employees was abolished
as of September 30, 1978.24
Under the Amendments, colleges and universities retain the
right to require the retirement of tenured faculty members at
age sixty-five until July 1, 1982.'= Top-level executives or high
policy-making employees in the private sector who have served
in those positions for two years prior to retirement are exempted
from the Act's additional five-year protection, provided they are
entitled to an immediate, annual, unforfeitable retirement benefit equivalent to a straight-life annuity of $27,000.26
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
was assigned to conduct a study on the effects of the 1978
Amendments on federal employees, and submit its report to the
President and Congress no later than January 1, 1980.n The
Over 65: A Case Against Mandatory Retirement: Hearings Before the House Select
Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong., 1st Sem. (1977); Active Americans Over 65 Speak on Retirement Age Policies: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977); Alternatives to Retirement: Hearings Before the House Select Comm.
on Aging, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Retirement Age Policies: Hearings Before the
House Select Comm. on Aging (pts. I & 11), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Retirement Age Policies]; Impact of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976); Age & Sex Discrimination in Employment & Review of Federal Response to
Employment Needs of the Elderly: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Aging,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
22. See generally STAFFOF HOUSESELECTCOMM.ON AGING,9 5 CONG.,
~ ~ ST SESS.,
REPORTON MANDATORY
RETIREMENT: THESOCIALAND HUMAN
COSTOF ENFORCED
IDLENESS (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as MANDATORY
RETIREMENT].
23. 29 U.S.C. 631(a) (Supp. 111 1979).
24. Id. 633a(a).
25. Id. $ 631(d).
26. Id. § 631(c).
27. Id. 633a(g). The responsibility of undertaking a study and submitting a report
to the President and Congress was originally assigned to the Civil Service Commission.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 5(g),
92 Stat. 192. This responsibility was later assigned to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission pursuant to Reorg. Plan No. 1of 1978,s 2,3 C.F.R. 321 (1978 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at 354 (Supp. 111 1979) and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1979),
effective Jan. 1, 1979, as provided by Exec. Order No. 12,106, 3 C.F.R. 263 (1978
Compilation).
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Secretary of Labor was directed to conduct a similar study focusing on the feasibility of raising the age protection above seventy years of age for private sector employees. Special attention
was to be directed to the bona fide executive and tenured faculty
exemptions. An interim report from the Secretary of Labor was
due January 1, 1981, and the final report is to be submitted to
the President and Congress by January 1, 1982?
The amended ADEA prohibits pension plans or seniority
systems from requiring the mandatory retirement of employees
protected under the Act. However, the effective date of the prohibition was delayed with respect to employee benefit plans or
seniority systems included in collective bargaining agreements.
The effective date in such cases was January 1, 1980, or the expiration of the contract, whichever occurred first.2s
The 1978 Amendments dealt with certain procedural issues
as well. Age discrimination claimants were given a right to a jury
trial on any issue of fact in actions seeking recovery of back pay,
liquidated damages, or other amounts owing as a result of a violation of the ADEA?O
The 1978 Amendments replaced the earlier "notice of intent
to sue" with a "charge" requirement. The charge is to be filed
with the EEOC and sets forth the identity of the potential defendant as well as describes the alleged discriminatory action.
However, the charge requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for bringing an action under the ADEA."
The statute of limitations may be tolled for one year during
conciliation conducted by the EEOC. The conciliation requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for bringing a cause of
action under ADEA, but the courts may stay pending lawsuits in
order to permit conciliation to be ~ o r n p l e t e d . ~ ~
11. MANDATORY
RETIREMENT
A. Public Opinion
According to testimony presented in congressional hearings,
28. 29 U.S.C. 5 624.
29. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95256, 5 2, 92 Stat. 189.
30. 29 U.S.C. 626(~)(supp. m 1979).
31. ~ d5 . 626(d).
32. Id. 5 626(e).
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the vast majority of Americans oppose mandatory retirement."
A 1974 Harris Poll asked people over eighteen years of age
whether they agreed with the statement: "Nobody should be
forced to retire because of age if he wants to continue working
and is stdl able to do a good job." The results were overwhelming-eighty-six percent agreed, including seventy-nine percent
of those age eighteen to sixty-four who are responsible for hiring
and firing?
This strong public sentiment against mandatory retirement
appears quite justified in view of several commentators' conclusions that the traditional bases for mandatory retirement are
proving to be myths." One in-depth study analyzed "the nine
most frequently cited reasons justifying mandatory retirement''
and concluded that the traditional justifications must be dismissed for a lack of substantiati~n.~~
Five of the cited reasons
are disability related and allege that the elderly: (1) work less
efficiently-and therefore are unable to maintain production
standards; (2) experience an intellectual decline in old age; (3)
show a decrease in stamina and strength which causes an inability to comply with employer safety requirements; (4) cannot adjust to new work situations and new company policies and practices due to inflexibility; and, (5) contract frequent illnesses
resulting in absences from work." The remaining four grounds
involve administrative dSculties that would supposedly arise if
mandatory retirement was banned: (6) increased corporate insurance costs; (7) the dficulty and costliness of administering
"a selective retirement system on an individual basis;" (8) discouragement of new blood in the company; and, (9) fear that
promotion openings would be diminished without mandatory retirement." The grounds enumerated that are capable of quantifiable verification not only lack substantiation but face statisti33. H.R. REp. NO.95-527 (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
34. Id.
35. See Note, Mandatory Retirement-A Vehicle for Age Discrimination, 51 CmKENT L. REV. 116,118-20 (1974) (section entitled "Myths That Support Mandatory Retirement") [hereinafter cited as Mandatory Retirement Myths]; Age Discrimination,
supra note 5, at 1315-18 (section entitled "The Infirm Basis of Age Discrimination");
Note, Mandatory Retirement: The Law, the Courts, and the Broader Social Context, 11
WILLAMF~TE
L.J. 398, 401-04 (1975) (section entitled "Mandatory Retirement: Fact and
Fiction") [hereinafter cited as Broader Social Context].
36. Mandatory Retirement Myths, supra note 35, at 118-20.
37. Id. at 118.
38. Id.
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cal evidence to the contrary.SBThe more subjective grounds are
considered by some to barely support a rational basis for
mandatory retirernenti4Oothers think them to be unfounded."

B. Government Employees
Although not arising under the ADEA, the leading case
dealing with mandatory retirement of government employees is
. ~Murgia
~
the
Massachusetts Board of Retirement u. M u r g i ~ In
Supreme Court rejected an equal protection attack against a
state law requiring uniformed police officers to retire at age
fifty? The Court applied a rational basis rather than a strict
scrutiny standard since it determined that neither is government
employment a fundamental right nor is age a suspect classification." The Court again applied the rationality standard in the
non-ADEA case of Vance v. Bradley" to defeat an equal protection challenge to the federal law requiring Foreign Service personnel to retire at age sixty."
39. MANDATORY
RETIREMENT,
supra note 22, a t 34-37, see generally sources cited
note 35 supra.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Bradley v. Vance, 436 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1977), reu'd, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Eglit, Another Name for Discrimination, CIV. LIB.REV., Fall 1974, at 87; Note, The ConstituL. REV.748 (1975);
tional Challenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST. JOHN'S
Note, Mandatory Retirement, 23 S.D. L. REV.358 (1978).
42. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
43. Id. at 312.
44. Id. at 312-13. In applying the rational basis standard, the Court cited San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973), for precedent that strict scrutiny of a legislative classification is necessary only "when the classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312
(footnotes omitted). Accordingly, the Court concluded that government employment is
not per se a fundamental right and that the class of uniformed officers over 50 years of
age does not constitute a suspect class.
The relative ease with which the Court reached its conclusion is surprising in light of
some of the Court's earlier equal protection decisions in which irrebuttable presumptions
were struck down in favor of individualized treatment under the rationality standard.
See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 (1973).
45. 440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979).
46. In an eight-to-one decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of 5 632 of
the Foreign Service Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 1015 (current version a t 22 U.S.C.
1002
(1976)), which requires that individuals covered by the Foreign Service retirement system retire-at age 60.
As in Murgia, the Court in Bradley reversed the decision of a three-judge district
court. However, in a significant expansion of the deference shown the legislature by the
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The Supreme Court's reluctance to provide greater age protection for federal employees as evidenced by Murgia and Bradley is at cross purposes with Congress' efforts to achieve greater
protection for elderly federal employees. Congress, for example,
in the 1974 amendments to the ADEA extended the Act's coverage to most government employees and raised the age protection
limit to seventy for federal civil service employees," five years
higher than for private sector employee^.^^ The 1978 Amendments went further, eliminating the seventy-year age limit and
prohibiting the mandatory retirement of those federal employees
covered by the ADEA.4@The 1978 Amendments also provided
protection for state and local government employees between
the ages of sixty-five and seventy,'O but did not affect the established exceptions to ADEA coverage for hazardous federal jobs"
and for certain foreign service p e r s ~ n n e l . ~ ~

C. Private Sector Employees
Protection for private sector employees under the original
ADEA terminated when the employees reached age sixty-five."
Legislative reports reveal that the age sixty-five ceiling was chosen for the ADEA because social security benefits generally begin at that age? In turn, the Social Security Act of 1935 borrowed age sixty-five from "the Old Age and Survivors Pension
Act which Otto von Bismarck pushed through as the first chancellor of the German Empire in 1889."SSDuring the debate preceding the passage of the ADEA, some legislators attacked the
Court in Murgia, the majority in Bradley placed a substantial burden upon plaintiffs
who challenge the factual bases for legislative classifications. The plaintiff's burden in an
equal protection case of this type is to "convince the court that the legislative facts on
which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true
by the governmental decisionmaker." 440 U.S. at 111 (citations omitted).
47. 29 U.S.C. 99 630(b), 63% (1976).
48. It is estimated that the 1974 amendments brought 95% of the federal civilian
work force under the ADEA. CCH, NEW 1978 MANDATORY RETIREMENT
AND AGE DISCRIMINATION RULES14 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AGEDISCRIMINATION
RULES(CCH)].
49. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (Supp. III 1979).
50. Id.
51. 123 CONG.RBC.29,002 (1977) (e.g., federal firefighters, law enforcement officials,
and air traffic controllers).
RULES(CCH), supra note 48, at 14.
52. AGEDISCRIMMATION
53. 29 U.S.C. 8 631 (1976) (amended 19'78).
54. S. REP. NO. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S.
CODECONG.& AD. NEWS504,525.
55. MANDATORY
RETIREMENT, supra note 22, at 1.
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setting of age sixty-five or any other age limit as arbitrary and
unfounded since the life expectancy in Bismarck's time was half
what it is today and advancements in medical science preserve
the fitness and working capacity of many people beyond sixtyfive years of age?
Opponents of the "arbitrary" age sixty-five protection limit
claimed partial victory with the 1978 Amendments when ADEA
protection was expanded to include most private sector employees from ages forty to seventy." Congress settled on the increase
to age seventy as "a compromise between some who favor removing the age limit entirely, and others who are uncertain of
the consequences of changing the present age sixty-five limit.""
Age seventy proved to be a popular compromise figure since
data was available from states such as New York showing that
the work of employees ages sixty-five to seventy "was 'about
equal to and sometimes noticeably better than younger
workers.' "5@

D. Studies and Reports Required
The 1978 Amendments foreshadow a possible removal of
the age limit altogether for ADEA protection in the private seetor within the next few years. The elimination of the seventyyear age limit for federal government employees is some evidence of congressional movement in that direction. An even
more significant indication is the 1978 amendment requiring the
Secretary of Labor to determine "the feasibility of raising such
limitation above 70 years of age" and "the feasibility of eliminating such limitati~n."~~
In 1977 there were an estimated twenty-two million Americans over age sixty-fiveabout the same number as there were
56. 113 CONC.REC. 31,256 (1967).
57. 29 U.S.C. 5 631(a) (Supp. III 1979). The very limited exceptions to the extended
coverage are discussed in text accompanying notes 79 to 98 infra.
58. H.R. REP. NO. 95-527 (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977).
59. S. REP.NO.95-493,95thCong., 1st Sesa. 3 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE
CONC.& AD. NEWS504, 506. See also id. 4-5, 7; Public Policy and the Future of Work
and Retirement: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 131-34 (1978) (section entitled "The Potential Labor Market Impact of Prohibiting
Mandatory Retirement Before Age 70") [hereinafter cited as Public Policy and the Future of Work and Retirement].
60. 29 U.S.C. 5 624 (Supp. III 1979) (interim report due Jan. 1, 1981; final report
due Jan. 1, 1982).
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blacks.61 The percentage of persons aged sixty-five and over in
the U.S. has increased from 9.9% in 1970 to approximately
11.2% in 1980 and is expected to increase to some 15.9% in 2020
and 19.0% in 2030.62Life expectancy has already increased from
61.7 years in 1935, when the Social Security Act was passed, to
72.5 years in 1976? It has beeh estimated that thirty-four percent of workers who reach retirement age "have both the ability
and the desire to continue or king."^ Other surveys reveal that
"over half of those employees who are forcibly retired are bitter
about it."66
In making his report, the Secretary of Labor should consider the impact of mandatory retirement on the individual. For
instance, mandatory retirement has been shown to cause mortality rates to jump as much as thirty percent? Also, the American
Medical Association has confirmed that " '[tlhe sudden cessation
of productive work and earning power of an individual, caused
by compulsory retirement, often leads to physical and emotional
illness and premature death.'
Mandatory retirement can have
a significant psychological i m p a ~ twhich
, ~ in turn contributes to
"such disorders as hypochondria, chronic fatigue states, neurotic
depression and, primarily among business executives, alcoholism. The unmistakable signs of stress and anxiety are also reflected by higher rates of suicide and functional mental illness in
the over-65 p~pulation."~~
While "[pleople in lower socio-economic groups have been
found to have only slightly poorer adjustment to retirement,"70
mandatory retirement does create greater difficulties for the elderly poor. Persons age sixty-five and older comprise a dispropor61. 123 CONG.REC.29,005 (1977).
OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE
62. BUREAU
UNITED
STATES:1979 at 29 (100th ed. 1979). Public Policy and the Future of Work and
Retirement, supra note 59, at 116-17.
63. 123 CONG.REC.34,320 (1977).
64. Mandatory Retirement Myths, supra note 35, at 117-18.
65. Retirement Age Policies (pt. I), supra note 21, at 40. The significance of this
figure is reduced by the concomitant finding that 39% of retirements are based on ability, not age. Id.
66. H.R. REP.NO. 95-527 (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
67. S. REP. NO. 95-493,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE
CONG.& AD. NEWS504,507.
68. See Note, Too Old to Work: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Retirement
Plans, 44 S. CAL.L. REV.150, 155-58 (1971) (section entitled "Psychological Aspects of
Retirement").
69. Age Discrimination, supra note 5, at 1323 (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at 1320.
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tionately large share of Americans whose annual incomes are below the poverty level. The elderly poor are naturally more
opposed to mandatory retirement than other older citizens. "In
other words, those who want to work beyond 65 are most often
those who need to work in order to maintain a minimal standard
of living."71 Some legislators also feel that mandatory retirement
is bankrupting the social security system and must be eliminated to save the system for the elderly who really need it."
From an employer's perspective the Secretary of Labor
should also investigate the validity of arguments contending that
abolishing mandatory retirement would impose administrative
and financial hardships on business.7s While some experts have
predicted that abolishing mandatory retirement would boost the
GNP and benefit business generally," the documented trend toward voluntary early retirement suggests that the impact on individual employers of abolishing mandatory retirement may be
only slight.76"A recent Roper poll found that nearly two-thirds
of Americans would like to retire before age 62, and over onethird prefer to retire before reaching 60."70 Furthermore, the
great majority of those desiring to work beyond age sixty-five
would prefer a part-time job." Congress is also willing to allow
downward adjustments in pension plan benefits for workers who
work beyond the "normal retirement" age." In short, in order to
comply with the 1978 Amendments' mandate to determine the
feasibility of abolishing mandatory retirement in the private sector, the Secretary of Labor's reporbmust weigh the impact of
71. S. REP.NO. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S.
CODECONC.& AD. NEWS504, 506, 507. See also, Retirement Age Policies (pt. I), supra
note 21, at 12.
72. MANDATORY
RETIREMENT,
supra note 22, at 47. See also, 123 CONC.REC.29,007,
30,555 (1977).
73. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra (discussion of myths about the
administrative convenience of mandatory retirement).
74. S.REP. NO. 95-493,95th Cong., 1st Sees. 4 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE
CONG.& AD. NEWS504,507; H.R. REP. NO. 95-527 (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess.2 (1977).
75. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-527 (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sees. 3, 29 (1977).
76. S. REP.NO. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sees. 32 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S.
CODECONC.& AD. NEWS504,526.
77. Public Policy and the Future of Work and Retirement, supra note 59, at 96. A
survey showed: prefer not to work = 28%; prefer to work part-time = 48.4%; prefer to
work full-time = 5.4%; not sure = 18.2%. Id.
78. See 124 CONG.RBc. S4,450 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1978); S. REP.NO. 95-493, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14-16 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S.CODECONC.& AD. NEWS504,51719. Regulations setting forth the guidelines for such adjustments are found a t 29 C.F.R. g
860.120 (1980).
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mandatory retirement on employees' physical, psychological,
and economic welfare against employers' possible administrative
and financial hardships.

A. Congress and Supreme Court Disagree
Congress' movement away from mandatory retirement was
substantially hindered by judicial interpretations of the exception to ADEA coverage carved out for retirement and pension
plans." Section 4(f) of the ADEA as originally enacted provided:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to observe
the terms of a . . . bona fide benefit employee plan such as a
retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this [Act].80

Because the language of this provision is susceptible to more
than one interpretation, a split emerged in the circuits concerning whether a retirement or pension plan that imposed
mandatory retirement based solely on age was a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of the ADEA. On the one side, the Fourth
Circuit8' relied upon the Act's legislative history to find that the
exception was intended to allow age discrimination only with respect to the benefits paid under certain plans. Presumably Congress felt that this narrow exception would overcome employers'
hesitancy to hire older workers who might demand full pension
benefits even though they may work only a few years.82The Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the statute supported the
Fourth Circuit's position. On the other side, the Second, Third,
and Fifth Circuits, along with district courts in the Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits, construed the
exception more broadly to permit the involuntary retirement of
older employees before age sixty-five pursuant to the terms of a
pension or retirement plan.79. See H.R. Rm. NO. 95-527 (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977).
80. 29 U.S.C. 623(f)' (1976). The section also affords exceptions for discharges for
cause or discrimination based on a bona fide occupational qualification.
81. McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), reu'd, 434 U.S.
192 (1977).
82. 113 CONG.REc. 31,255 (1967); H.R. REP. NO. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in [I9671 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS2213, 2217.
83. See Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008
(1977); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974); McKinley v.
Bendix Corp., 420 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D.
Mo. 1976); Bradley v. Kissinger, 418 F. Supp. 64
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In United Air Lines v. M ~ M a n n the
, ~ Supreme Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's position and instead adopted the
broad interpretation of the exception. In doing so, the Supreme
Court relied principally upon the ordinary meaning of section
4(f)'s language and only cursorily examined the legislative history.8s The Court also held that a bona fide plan established
before the passage of the Act in 1967 could not be a subterfuge
to evade the
Finally, the Court rejected any "per se rule
requiring an employer to show an economic or business purpose
in order to satisfy the subterfuge language of the Act."87
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan in dissent,
massaged the legislative history more rigorously than the majority did and reached a contrary ~onclusion.The dissent argued
that the majority violated principles of statutory ~onstruction~~
and misconstrued congressional intent8@by adopting a broad in(D.D.C. 1976); Dunlop v. Hawaii Telephone Co., 415 F. Supp. 330 (D. Hawaii 1976); De
Loraine v. MEBA Pension Trust, 355 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd,499 F.2d 49 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Kincaid v. United Steelworkers of Am., 5 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 7258 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
84. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
85. Id. at 199-202.
86. Id. at 203. The Court did not discuss the exact language of the exception, however, which does not allow a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act.
87. Id.
88. The majority did examine the ADEA's legislative history, 434 U.S. at 199-202,
but clearly felt that the plain language of the statute supported its position. After noting
the dissent's heavy reliance upon the legislative history, the Court observed that under
traditional canons of interpretation resort to legislative history is "irrelevant" where an
unambiguous statute exists. Id. at 199.
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, disputed the correctness of the majority's
plain meaning interpretation. He stated:
The opinion of the Court assumes that this language is clear on its face.
Ante, at 199. I cannot agree with this premise. In my view, the statutory language is susceptible of at least two interpretations, and the only reading consonant with congressional intent would preclude involuntary retirement of employees covered by the Act.
Id. at 209 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. Both the majority and the dissent believed that they correctly followed congressional intent in reaching their respective conclusions. Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the majority, stated:
Giving meaning to each of these provisions leads inescapably to the conclusion they were intended to permit observance of the mandatory retirement
terms of bona fide retirement plans, but that the existence of such plans could
not be used as an excuse not to hire any person because of age.
U.S. at 201-02.
Justice Marshall wrote in defense of the dissent's interpretation:
To construe the 5 4(f)(2) exemption broadly to authorize involuntary retirement when no statement in the Committee Reports or by the Act's floor managers or sponsors in the debates supports that interpretation flouts this funda-
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terpretation of the exception. While McMann was under consideration by the Court, the amendment machinery was already operating to clarify the statute's legislative intent by adopting the
interpretation the dissent followed. Indeed, "[tlhe mischief the
Court fashions today may be short-lived."a0
The 1978 Amendments to the ADEA added the following
clarification to section 4(f)(2): "and no such seniority system or
employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this title because of the age of such individual."@lThe Conference Report accompanying the 1978 Amendments emphasizes that the
Supreme Court had misconstrued the exception in McMann:
The conferees agree that the purpose of the amendment to
section 4(f)(2) is to make absolutely clear one of the original
purposes of this provision, namely, that the exception does not
authorize an employer to require or permit involuntary retirement of an employee within the protected age group on account of age.
In McMann . . the Supreme Court held to the contrary. . . . The conferees specifically disagree with the Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in that case. Plan provisions in effect prior to the date of enactment are not exempt
under section 4(f)(2) by virtue of the fact that they antedate
the act or these amendments.-

.,

Congress was compelled to make this clarification and reverse
the effect of McMann for the increased age limit to seventy
years to have any real meaningB8since over ninety percent of the
pension plans in the private sector designate sixty-five as the age
for retirement?
mental principle of construction [remedial statutes should be liberally
interpreted].
. . But the Committee Reports of both Houses make plain that, properly
understood, the existing Act already prohibits involuntary retirement, and that
the amendment [one of the 1978 Amendments] is only a clarification necessitated by court decisions misconstruing congressional intent [citations omitted].
434 U.S. at 218 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. 434 U.S. at 218 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
91. 29 U.S.C. g 623(0(2) (supp. m 1979).
92. H.R. REp. NO. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE
CONG.& AD. NEWS528, 529.
93. H.R. REP.NO. 95-52?? (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess.8 (1977).
94. Broader Social Context, supra note 35, at 400. See also H.R. REP.NO. 95-527
(pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977); MANDATORY
RETIREMENT, supra note 22, at 2.

.
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B. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Remains
Unchanged
Since Congress has plugged the section 4(f)(2) pension plan
loophole, employers will likely turn to section 4(f)(l), the bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception to ADEA protection, which was left untouched by the 1978 Amendments.
Early cases involving the BFOQ exception dealt with age discrimination in hiring,@'yet more recently such actions have been
brought in a termination on text.^ The three courts of appeals
that have considered the application of the BFOQ exception
under the ADEA have fashioned two different approaches, yielding different results.97 The two approaches that have emerged
95. See, e.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976);
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122
(1974); Aldendifer v. Continental Air Lines, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1090 (D. Cal. 1978).
96. See, e.g., Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 420 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1976), remanded on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1010 (1978).
97. In Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1975), the Seventh Circuit upheld the defendant bus company's maximum hiring age of 35 for intercity bus drivers. The court reasoned that when public
safety is involved, employers owing a duty of safety to the public have a minimal burden
in proving a rational basis for the discriminatory hiring practice.
The Fifth Circuit in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.
1976), also considered an unsuccessful applicant's attack against a maximum hiring age
of 40 for intercity bus drivers. In addition to requiring that the employer show that its
job qualifications were "reasonably necessary" to achieve public safety-the Hodgson
standard-the Fifth Circuit further required that the employer show that job applicants
over a certain age were incapable of meeting its job qualifications. Id. at 235-36. The
defendant employer in Tamiami prevailed because the court of appeals upheld the district court's finding that no effective and reliable individual testing procedure existed to
verify older applicants' compliance with safety standards. Id. at 238.
Contrary to the outcome in Tamiami and Hodgson, the Eighth Circuit in Houghton
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977),
though following the Tamiami line of analysis, refused to grant the defendant employer
a BFOQ exemption. In Houghton, the employee test pilot contested his employer's reduction of its pilot staff on the basis of the age of the pilots. While conceding the absence of a functional individual testing procedure, the court held that the employer had
failed to meet its burden of establishing a factual basis showing that all, or substantially
all, older pilots were incapable of performing test pilot duties safely. Id. a t 564. The
employer's failure to meet its burden proved determinative in light of the employee's
impressive array of evidence to the effect that safety risks attributable to aging among
professional pilots are minuscule. Id. The result in Houghton may also be distinguished
from Hodgson and Tamiami in that it was a termination action while the latter were
hiring cases.
Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Hodgson and Houghton, it is
uncertain what standard of review the Supreme Court will eventually apply in BFOQ
cases-the less exacting standard of Hodgson or the stricter standard of Tamiami and
Houghton.
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from these three cases have been critici~ed,@~
and this particular
conflict among the circuits appears ripe for consideration in the
Supreme Court.
IV. JURY TRIAL
A. Congress & Supreme Court Agree
The original ADEA section 7(c) provided that "[alny person
aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the
purposes of this [Act]."@@
Courts split over the question of
whether the statute's language guaranteed a right to a jury trial,
as in FLSA actions, or denied a jury trial, as in title VII actions.
The Third and Fourth Circuits and district courts in the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits decided that the parties in an
ADEA action are entitled to a jury,loOwhile the Sixth Circuit
and district courts in the Second and Fifth Circuits held that
the right to a jury trial does not exist.lol
The question of the right to a jury trial in an ADEA action
brought against a private party was finally resolved in Lorillard
v. Pons.loPIn Lorillard, a unanimous Supreme Court held that
ADEA's provision assuring "legal or equitable relief' means the
right to a jury trial.loSThe 1978 amendments incorporated the
Lorillard holding by stating: "[A] person shall be entitled to a
trial by jury of any issue of fact in any such action for recovery
of amounts owing as a result of a violation of this chapter
. . . ."IM It should also be noted that although it was the employee who requested the jury in Lorillard, the decision granting
the claimant such a right does not necessarily indicate a pro98. Comment, Age Discrimination in Employment-The Bona Fide Occupational
Defense-Balancing the Interest of the OMer Worker in Acquiring and Continuing Employment Against the Interest in Public Safety, 24 WAYNE
L. REV. 1339,1354-61 (1978).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976).
100. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1977); Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd,434 U.S. 575
(1978); Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Or. 1977); Bertrand v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976), a f d on rehearing, 432 F. Supp.
952 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 69 F.R.D. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
101. Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1976); Travers v. Corning Glass
Works, 76 F.R.D. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); PolstorB v. Fletcher, 430 F. Supp. 592 (N.D. Ala.
1977).
102. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
103. Id. at 584-85. See also Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1977).
104. 29 U.S.C. g 626(~)(2)(supp. m 1979).
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elderly opinion. In title VII actions, for example, the denial of a
jury trial can be considered prodiscriminatee because it prevents
an employer from rehearsing before a jury the damaging effects
and losses suffered because of a plaintiffs incompetence. Frequently, juries are more sympathetic toward the employer's
cause than the plaintiffs plight. Age discrimination claimants
may run the same risk.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether claimants bringing age discrimination suits
against the federal government are entitled to a jury trial, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has ruled that they do.lo6

B. Available Damages Unchanged
Congress bypassed the opportunity in the 1978 amendments
to explicitly delineate the types of damages available for ADEA
violations. Liquidated damages have been allowed in "cases of
willful violations" since the ADEA's inception,lMbut the Act is
silent with regard to punitive damages and damages for pain
and suffering. The Conference Report accompanying the 1978
amendments does state that punitive damages should not be
available.lo7Most courts agree1" with one exception.10@
105. Nakshian v. Claytor, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 14,455 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Nakshian,
a 62-year-old civilian employee brought an age discrimination suit against the United
States Department of the Navy and demanded a jury trial. The Government opposed the
jury demand on the ground that because Congress in authorizing ADEA actions did not
specifically authorize jury trials, they were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the sovereign immunity argument by obaerving that Congress waived the Government's sovereign immunity when it authorized
ADEA suits to be brought against the government, even though it did not specify what
trial procedure was to be used in such cases. Id. at 14,458.
The court of appeals also referred to the district court's opinion where it was noted
that the phrase "legal relief," which had been a key point of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lorillard, was also used in ADEA's provision regarding federal employees (29
U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1976)). Moreover, the court of appeals' own review of the statute and
its legislative history persuaded it to accept the "inference that Congress intended to
provide for jury trials in ADEA actions against the Government." 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. a t
14,458.
106. 29 U.S.C. 8 626(b) (1976).
107. H.R. REP.NO. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE
CONG.& AD. NEWS528, 535.
108. Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 570 F.2d 1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1978);
Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1066 (1977); Douglas v. American Cyanamid Co., 472 F. Supp. 298,300-04 (D. Conn.
1979); Stevenson v. J.C. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 945,946-49 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Riddle v.
Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678, 679-80 (N.D. Okla. 1978); Fellows v.
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The Conference Report made no reference to damages for
pain and suffering.l1° With no definitive direction from either
Congress or the Supreme Court, the current status of the law
concerning damages for pain and suffering is unsettled. Most
courts that have addressed the question have referred to damages for pain and suffering as compensatory damages. The majority position is represented by the First, Third, Fourth, and
Fifth Circuits and district courts in the Second, Sixth, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits, which have held that compensatory damages
for pain and suffering are not available.ll1 The opposite position-permitting recovery of damages for pain and suffering-has been initially taken by some district courts, only to be
reversed in most instances by the courts of appeals."' The Seventh"' and Tenth114 Circuits have district courts holding both
Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199,202 (D. Or. 1977); Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533, 537 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank,
427 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D. Colo. 1977); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329, 1337
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
109. Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008, 1009-11 (D.
Colo. 1978). The Kennedy holding has been questioned by a sister district court of the
same circuit in Riddle v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678, 679-80 (D.
Okla. 1978).
Two district courts that originally permitted recovery of punitive damages were subsequently reversed. See yalker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730,*731(D.S.C. 1977),
rev'd, 605 F.2d 128,129-30 (4th Cir. 1979); Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410
F. Supp. 1403, 1405-06 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd in part, reu'd and remanded in part per
curium, 570 F.2d 1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1978).
110. The phrase "damages for pain and suffering" is used here to include closely
allied damages such as psychological, psychic, and mental or emotional distress damages.
This generic grouping is necessary since some courts do not draw precise distinctions.
111. Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292,1296 (4th Cir. 1979); Vazquez
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v. American Security
Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036,1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834,839-42 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978); Catlett v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 358, 365-67 (W.D. Mo.
1978); Ellis v. Philippine Airlines, 443 F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Postemski v.
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Corp., 443 F. Supp. 101, 103 (D. Conn. 1977); Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533, 535-37 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Travers v.
Coming Glass Works, 76 F.R.D. 431, 435-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rechsteiner v. Madison
Fund, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 499, 501 (D. Del. 1977); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp.
1329, 1335-38 (E.D.Pa. 1976); Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
112. Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730, 732 (D.S.C. 1977), rev'd, 605
F.2d 128,129-30 (4th Cir. 1979); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655,
663-64 (W.D. Va. 1977); Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403,
1404-06 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'din part, rev'd and remanded in part per curiam, 570 F.2d
1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1978).
113. Compare Morton v. Sheboygan Memorial Hosp., 458 F. Supp. 804, 807 (E.D.
Wis. 1978); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706,713-14 (E.D. Wis. 1978), and
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ways. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in two cases disallowing damages for pain and suffering.ll5 Moreover, some authorities infer from the 1978 amendments' Conference Report
that congressional intent agrees with the majority of courts that
damages for pain and suffering in ADEA actions should be
denied. l6

A. Exhaustion of State Remedies

The ADEA provides that "no suit may be brought" under
the Act until sixty days after state proceedings have been commenced if the alleged age discrimination occurred in a state
which prohibits such discrimination and has an enforcement
mechanism.l17 Forty-one states plus the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico now have laws prohibiting age discrimination in
Hence, the question whether exhaustion of state
Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123, 1132-33 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd
on rehearing, 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (these three cases allowed recovery of
compensatory damages), with Jaeger v. American Cyanamid Co., 442 F. Supp. 1270,
1272-73 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (disallowing recovery of damages).
114. Compare Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008,
1009-11 (D. Colo. 1978), and Combes v. Griftin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D.
Okla. 1976) (these two cases allowed recovery of compensatory damages), with Riddle v.
Getty Ref. & Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Okla. 1978) (disallowing recovery of
damages).
115. Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834,
839-42 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
116. See, e.g., Riddle v. Getty Ref. & Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678, 679-80 (N.D.
Okla. 1978); 29 S.C.L. REV. 705, 715 (1978).
But see Note, Damage Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
L. REV.47,51-68 (1976) (pre-Conference Report arguments that comAct, 43 BROOKLYN
pensatory damages for pain and suffering should be allowed).
117. 29 U.S.C. 3 633(b) (1976). Expressly, the ADEA does not preempt state regulation, id. $ 633(a), and state acts can properly provide broader protection than the minimum standards of the ADEA, Simpson v. Alaska State Comm. for Human Rights, 423 F.
Supp. 552 (D. Alaska 1976). See generally Comment, The 1%7 Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and Preemption: A Case for Broader State Laws, 12 U.S.F. L. REV.
283 (1978).
RULES(CCH), supra note 48, a t 33-42. Nine states have no
118. AGE DISCRIMINATION
law against age discrimination in employment (~labama,Arkansas, Kansas, Mississippi,
Missouri, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming); four states protect only very
limited groups of employees (Arizona, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and South Dakota);
fifteen states and the District of Columbia protect the elderly to a specified age but have
a McMann-type exception (Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin); six states and Puerto Rico protect the elderly to a specified age
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remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an ADEA action was
one of general concern. Because of the considerable controversy
among the circuits, the Supreme Court recently resolved the
question in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans.llQIn Evans a terminated employee had filed a notice of intent to sue with the Department of Labor, which in turn erroneously advised the plaintiff that he need not file a state complaint. By failing to do so,
plaintiff violated section 14(b) of the ADEA.lm Concluding that
section 14(b) was patterned after section 706(b) of title VII,"'
which requires initial resort to state proceedings, a unanimous
Court held that resort to state remedies in ADEA actions is also
l~~
the secmandatory before federal relief is ~ 0 u g h t . Concerning
ond aspect of the Court's holding, a divided Court ruled that the
plaintiffs cause of action was not defeated for failure to comply
with the state's statute of 1imitati0ns.l~~
(Colorado, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia); nine states
have no age limit on age discrimination protection but have a McMann-type exception
(Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, and New Mexico); and seven states simply prohibit any age discrimination in employment (Alaska,
California, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, and North Carolina).
119. 441 U.S. 750 (1979).
120. Id. at 754.
121. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). The pertinent
language of 8 706(b) states:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a
State, . . . which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment
practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to
grant or seek relief from such practice . . ., no charge may be filed . . . by the
person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have
been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have
been earlier terminated.
Id.
122. It may be argued that the Court's decision to compel initial resort to state remedies was in part motivated by a desire to reduce the federal caseload. See sources cited
note 147 infra.
123. In a five-to-four decision on this point, the majority interpreted the language of
§ 14(b) to only preclude the filing of a federal action until 60 days after state proceedings
have been commenced. 441 U.S. at 759. The majority justified its construction of the
statute on two grounds: (1) it aids laymen, who, unassisted by counsel, initiate the filing
process, and (2) it fulfills the statute's purpose of granting "state agencies a limited opportunity to settle grievances of ADEA claimants in a voluntary and localized manner so
that the grievants thereafter have no need or desire for independent federal relief." Id. at
761.
Justice Stevens on the other hand, writing for the four member dissent, criticized
the majority for "volunteer[ing] some detailed legal advice about the effect of a suggested course of conduct that respondent may now pursue and then order[ing] that his
suit be held in abeyance while he follows that advice." Id. at 767 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The question of whether the respondent would be entitled to relief in federal court
if his complaint were found to be time-barred by state law, reasoned Justice Stevens,
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The Court's decision in Evans was in marked contrast to
the Senate Report regarding the 1978 Amendments, which states
"that an individual who has been discriminated against because
of age is free to proceed either under state law or under federal
law. The choice is up to the individual."12* In other words, the
sixty days restriction was not intended to be jurisdictional,
rather it was intended to "give the State the prescribed minimum period in which to take remedial action" if a person
elected to apply first to a state agency for relief.12' However,
since the 1978 Amendments did not reenact the section in question, the lower federal courts in addition to the Supreme Court
have felt free to disregard the congressional comments.12'

B. 180-Day Charge
Section 8(d) of the original ADEA provided that no civil action could be brought under the Act until the Secretary of Labor
had received notice of intent to sue within 180 days "after the
alleged unlawful practice occurred."127 Controversy has arisen
regarding when the time period begins to run"' and what constitutes adequate notice,ln but the most significant issue has been
whether the requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite or
whether it is subject to tolling on equitable grounds.1s0The 1978
Amendments relaxed the standard for what constitutes adequate
notice to the Secretary of Labor from "notice of an intent to file
such an action" to filing "a charge alleging unlawful discriminawould be appropriately raised only after the respondent had pursued his state court remedies. To rule otherwise would be to render an advisory opinion on the merits of his
claim. Id.
124. S. REP.NO. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S.
CODECONG.& AD. NEWS504, 510.
125. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
126. See, e.g., Hadfield v. Mitre Corp., 459 F. Supp. 829, 831-32 (D. Mass. 1978).
127. 29 U.S.C. 5 626(d)(1) (1976).
128. Compare Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975), and
Marshall v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5097 (N.D. Ga. 1977), with Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977); Payne v. Crane Co., 560 F.2d
198 (5th Cir. 1977), and Davis v. RJR Foods, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
129. Compare Noto v. JFD Elec. Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1044 (E.D.N.C.
1978); Sutherland v. SKI? Indus., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1976), and Woodford
v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973), with Enos v. Kaiser Indus.
Corp., 443 F. Supp. 798 (D.D.C. 1978); Berry v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 673 (N.D. Cal. 1976), and Hughes v. Beaunit Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1564
(E.D. Tenn. 1976).
130. See generally Note, Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 457, 459-74 (1977).
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tion" with the EEOC.lS1 On the more controversial issue the
1978 Conference Report stated, "The conferees agree that the
'charge' requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining an action under the ADEA and that therefore equitable
modification for failing to file within the time period will be
available to plaintiffs under this Act."'"
The circuits are evenly split concerning whether the 180-day
charge requirement is jurisdictional. The Third Circuit and district courts in the First and Second Circuits have held that the
180-day charge is not jurisdictional.lSs Contrary holdings are
found in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and in district courts in
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.18( The Tenth Circuit and district
courts in the District of Columbia and Third Circuits have held
both ways.'" The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Shell Oil
Co. v. Dartt,ls8 a pre-1978 Amendments case, to resolve the con-

131. 29 U.S.C. 5 626(d) (Supp. I11 1979). "[Tlhe conferees intend that the 'charge'
requirement will be satisfied by the filing of a written statement which identifies the
potential defendant and generally describes the action believed to be diacriminatory."
H.R. REP. NO. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODECONG.&
AD. NEWS528, 533-34.
Pursuant to Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 8 2, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at 354 (Supp. I11 1979) a d in 92 Stat. 3781 (1979), most of the
functions relating to age discrimination administration and enforcement that had originally been vested in the Secretary of Labor and the Civil Service Commission were
transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, effective Jan. 1,1979, as
provided by Exec. Order No. 12,106, 3 C.F.R. 263 (1978 Compilation). Accordingly, the
charge requirement is filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
132. H.R. REP. NO. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE
CONC.& AD. NEWS528, 533-34.
133. Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977); Jackson v. Alcan
Sheet & Plate, 462 F. Supp. 82 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Franci v. Avco Corp., 460 F. Supp. 389
(D. Conn. 1978); Postemski v. Pratt Whitney Aircraft, 443 F. Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1977);
Abbott v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 643 (D.N.H. 1977); Skoglund v.
Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975).
134. Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976); Ott v. Midland-Roes
Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975); Hiscott v. G.E. Corp., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975);
Woodburn v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 531 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1976); Edwards v. Kaiser
Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485, rehearing denied, 498 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1974); Clark v. Emerson
Elec. Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 216 (N.D. Miss. 1977); R a p e r v. Greater Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 400 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Va. 1975); Oshiro v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 378 F.
Supp. 80 (D. Hawaii 1974).
135. Compare Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977); Mazzare v. Burroughs Corp., 473 F. Supp. 234
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Wagner v. Sperry Univac, Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 458 F. Supp. 505
(E.D. Pa. 1978), and Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974), with Law
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975); Bengochea v. Norcross, Inc., 464
F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1979), a d Gebhard v. G.A.F. Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504 (D.D.C. 1973).
136. 434 U.S. 99, rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 1042 (1977), aff'g539 F.2d 1256 (10th
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flict but did nothing more than affirm without opinion "by an
equally divided Court"lS7 the lower court's conclusion that the
180 days is not jurisdictional. Thus, the Supreme Court is only
tentatively aligned with congressional intent expressed in comments to the 1978 Amendments that the 180-day requirement be
susceptible to modification on equitable grounds.

C. Conciliation by Federal Agency
The primary reason for the 180-day charge requirement is
to afford the EEOC an opportunity to encourage conciliation
and settlement of the dispute before it proceeds to trial. Some
courts have been willing to stay an ADEA proceeding in order to
make conciliation more meaningful.lM The 1978 Amendments
sought to accomplish the same result by making a one-year tolling of the statute of limitations available "[while] the Commission [EEOC] is attempting to effect voluntary compliance with
requirements of [the ADEA] through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion."1sB
The Conference Report accompanying the 1978 Amendments stated "that conciliation is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action under the act."140 The
Eighth Circuit and a district court in the Fourth Circuit agree
with that interpretation,141but district courts in the Fifth, Sixth,
Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that conciliation by the federal agency is jurisdictional.14Vhe issue has never reached the
Supreme Court, and the decision in D ~ r t t "is~ too tenuous to
Cir. 1976).
137. Id. (Stewart, J. did not participate).
138. See, e.g., Brennan v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1724
(E.D. Ky. 1976); Dunlop v. Sandia Corp., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 128 (D.N.M. 1975).
See also Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974) (recognizing the
court's power to stay ADEA proceedings).
139. 29 U.S.C. 5 626(c) (Supp. 111 1979).
140. H.R. REP. NO. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE
CONG.& AD. NEWS528, 534.
141. Brennan v. Ace Hardware, 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974); Marshall v. Newburg
R-2 School Dist., 469 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R.
Co., 461 F. Supp. 362 (D. Md. 1978); Brennan v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 12 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1724 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (action stayed); Dunlop v. Sandia Corp., 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 128 (D.N.M. 1975) (action stayed).
142. Vasquez v. City of Reno, 461 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Nev. 1978); Usery v. Sun Oil
Co. (Delaware), 423 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Dunlop v. Resource Sciences Corp.,
410 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Okla. 1976); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143 (E.D.
Mich. 1974).
143. 434 U.S. 99 (1977), aff'g 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
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apply by analogy. Perhaps the strongest factor in favor of the
nonjurisdictional view of conciliation is that the 1978 Amendments addressed that specific section of the ADEA and congressional comment should, therefore, be persuasive evidence of legislative intent.144

VI. RESOLVING
THE

TENSION

The tension between Congress and the courts regarding
ADEA issues is not incurable. The concept of protection against
age discrimination in employment has been discussed on a national level for nearly twenty years and has been codified for the
last fourteen years.14s During that time research has generated
voluminous studies and statistical data which have been compiled and digested to shape current policy. This extended gestation period coupled with the ongoing studies should convince the
courts that Congress' persistent movement toward greater protection of the elderly is prudent and sound. For these reasons,
the time has arrived for Congress and the courts to pull
together.
Both the federal courts and Congress must bear some of the
blame for significant differences of opinion that have arisen with
respect to many of the major ADEA issues. The federal judiciary's, and most notably the Supreme Court's, lack of deference
to the clear movement in Congress to provide greater employment protection for the elderly may involve more than a simple
lack of sensitivity to the pr0b1em.l~~
The narrow interpretations
of the ADEA and particularly the establishment of certain "jurisdictional" requirements could be just another manifestation
of the federal judiciary's trend to contract jurisdictional boundaries in order to relieve an overloaded federal docket."' The judiciary also has cause to complain that Congress should be more
144. 2A C. SANDS,STATUTES
AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
$9 48.02-.16 (4th ed.
1972).
145. See text accompanying notes 2 to 6 supra.
146. In contrast to some members of the federal judiciary, many state judges have

been quick to condemn mandatory retirement, especially when the issue has applied to
them personally. See Calvert, Mandatory Retirement of Judges, 54 JUD. 424 (1971); Federal Courts Uphold Differing Retirement Rules, 59 JUD. 304 (1976); New York Civil
Judges Attack Mandatory Retirement, 58 JUD. 304 (1975); Mandatory Retirement of
Judges Upheld in Massachusetts, 56 JUD. 260 (1973).
147. See Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal
L. REV. 841 (1977);
Courts out of the Business of Protecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS
Yarbrough, Litigant Access Doctrine and the Burger Court, 31 VAND.L. REV.33 (1978).
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consistent and explicit in formulating its employment protection
policies for the elderly, especially since Congress has enacted a
hybrid ADEA composed of bits and pieces of other acts.14'
Since Congress undoubtedly had the constitutional power to
incorporate a more comprehensive and exact expression of intent in the ADEA and in the 1978 Amendments, there must be
reasons why it did not. First is the political reality of compromise. In order to obtain the necessary votes and satisfy competing interests, the sponsors must frequently substitute diluted
language, thereby muddling the clarity of intent. Also, it is not
uncommon for Congress to issue its legislative mandates in general terms so as to afford administrative agencies broad discretion in implementing congressional directives."@ Desirable flexibility and innovative license are lost as congressional specificity
increases. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect an overloaded
Congress to hammer out the minute details of each measure it
passes. The adversarial system can sharpen the issues if litigation does result, and permit a case-by-case treatment of delicate
problems. This in turn allows courts and the inertia of the status
quo to filter out faddish or ill-conceived movements spawned by
broad-sweeping concerns so that only reform of sound merit survives. And finally, Congress' method of dealing with employment
discrimination against the elderly may be intentionally piecemeal so as to approach, rather than reach beyond, the necessary
degree of specific regulation and control.lW
The factors favoring more explicit enactment of legislative
intent vary in their degree of importance. Congressional mandates regarding the ADEA issues over which courts have disagreed should reduce litigation costs and conserve scarce judicial
resources. Greater specificity by Congress ensures the retention
148. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
149. The ADEA specifically provides in relevant part:
[Tlhe Secretary of Labor may issue such rules and regulations as he may consider necessary or appropriate for carrying out this chapter, and may establish
such reasonable exemptions to and from any or all provisions of this chapter as
he may find necessary and proper in the public interest.
29 U.S.C. g 628 (1976). But see note 151 infra.
150. The current popularity of deregulation acts indicates that Congress is aware of
and desires to avoid overregulation. Two recent examples include the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504,92 Stat. 1705 and the Depository Institutions
Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221,94 Stat. 142. See also S. 1400,96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979) (proposal to deregulate the trucking industry); Economic Regulation of
the Trucking Industry: Hearings on S. 1400 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Tramportation (pt. 2), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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of policy decisionmaking power in the legislature-a body responsive to the political process-rather than delegating implementation to the burgeoning administrative bureaucracy.1s1
Also, the time for implementing needed social reform is hastened when congressional intent is unequivocal. Most important,
enactment of a more explicit legislative mandate improves the
chances that the courts will uphold congressional intent regarding the ADEA.
Despite the obstacles, the most workable resolution of the
tension would be for Congress to clarify its intent by enacting
the substance of its comments by further amendment to the
ADEA. The alternative of the federal judiciary giving credence
to the legislative history and comments of the amended ADEA
is unlikely to occur inasmuch as the courts seem to insist on interpreting the ADEA by reference to analogous legislative acts
instead.lS2Therefore, Congress must provide the necessary specificity itself. Under such circumstances it would be much more
difficult for federal courts to frustrate Congress' intent and the
tension could be cured-resolved in favor of the working elderly.
VII. CONCLUSION
Full and rapid achievement of the ADEA's principal purpose of providing greater protection to the elderly against employment discrimination has been hindered because of the Supreme Court's and some federal courts' failure to recognize or
follow expressed congressional intent, thereby creating a tension
between Congress and the federal judiciary over questions of age
discrimination. The 1978 Amendments represent another step
forward by Congress to clarify its original intent and to extend
greater protection against age discrimination. Controversy remains, however, with respect to damages for pain and suffering,
bona fide occupational qualification exceptions, and the
mandatory retirement of state and local government employees.
In addition, Congress must still determine whether even greater
protection will be afforded to the elderly.
151. Only meager interpretative regulations for the ADEA were issued by the Secretary of Labor. See 29 C.F.R. § 860 (1979). Shortly after enactment of the 1978 Amendments, administrationof the ADEA was transferred to the EEOC. See Reorg. Plan No. 1
of 1978, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at 354 (Supp.
I11 1979) and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1979).
152. See, e.g., Hadfield v. Mitre Corp., 459 F. Supp. 829 (D. Mass. 1978) (knowingly
ignores Congress' explanation that exhaustion of state remedies is not jurisdictional).
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Several proposals for further amendment of the ADEA are
currently under intensive review, and findings were being transmitted by the Secretary of Labor to the President and Congress
by January 1,1981 in an interim report and by January 1, 1982
in final form. Once these reports are received, a solid basis
should exist for the next Congress to confidently amend the
ADEA. Hopefully, Congress will have learned by frustrating experience that its intent and the substance of its comments need
to be expressly enacted in the ADEA by amendment. Then Congress together with the courts can attain what the 1978 Arnendments presage-more complete protection against age discrimination in employment.
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